Mortgage demand (applications) decreased 4.2 percent from one week earlier, according to data from the Mortgage Bankers Association’s (MBA) Weekly Mortgage Applications Survey for the week ending August 18, 2023.
The Market Composite Index, a measure of mortgage loan application volume, decreased 4.2 percent on a seasonally adjusted basis from one week earlier. On an unadjusted basis, the Index decreased 6 percent compared with the previous week. The Refinance Index decreased 3 percent from the previous week and was 35 percent lower than the same week one year ago. The seasonally adjusted Purchase Index decreased 5 percent from one week earlier. The unadjusted Purchase Index decreased 7 percent compared with the previous week and was 30 percent lower than the same week one year ago.
The spread betweenn Bankrate’s 30 year rate at 7.62% and the effective rate on mortgage debt outstanding at 3.595% has exploded as mortgage rates jump.
Today’s mortgage rates are up to 7.49%. OMG!
Bidenomics (code for making large donors wealthier and the middle class getting the boot) and catch-up for Yellenomics (rates too low for too long), and Powell are helping to burn down the housing market.
Yes, The Fed has a line on you! And will likely keep raising rates as inflation stays elevated. This means higher mortgage rates unless China slips into a deflation doom loop.
Thanks in part to The Fed, housing affordability is at the lowest level since the 1980s.
And we are seeing tail volatility in the US Treasury futures.
Fastest Ever Rate of Increase in Credit Card Debt!!
Credit card debt has been rising at what seems like an alarming rate. To cope with Bidenflation.
Credit Card Delinquencies Gapping Higher!
This chart seems almost scary because it shows a rapid rise in delinquencies. While not quite “parabolic” it has increased by almost 50% in a little over a year! However, 0.8% to 1.15% seems a lot less scary than saying it has increased by 50% (which is why I tune out whenever anyone talks about credit spread moves in percentage terms).
Not only is credit card debt rising at an alarming rate, it is also coming just as delinquencies spike higher!
The Consumer is Normalizing
Let’s revisit the prior two charts but use a different time horizon.
Credit Card Debt Remains Below Trend
Credit card debt rose at a steady pace from 2013 until late 2019. Then COVID, stimulus, work from home, and supply chain issues all seemed to coalesce into an amazing drop in credit card debt. While we can question whether credit card debt should have been rising at the rate that it was before COVID (and whether it was sustainable or not), we should just accept that it was. Maybe population growth has changed (or it was some other factor), but if you “strip out” the COVID phenomenon, we are basically back to trend. I do think that credit card balances are an issue, but it is an issue that we seem to have dealt with in the past.
On credit cards, I completely ignore any impact from Fed hikes because credit card interest rates have always been very high relative to any other rate. What drives credit card balances doesn’t seem to be a thoughtful analysis of rates. It has always been (at least to some degree) about instant gratification.
Bottom line is that while the trend may not be sustainable, the recent rise just brings us back to trend, which takes some of the sting out of the fact that the consumer is in dire trouble.
Delinquencies are Below the 5 and 10-Year Averages!
So, delinquencies aren’t even back to pre-COVID levels. This data series averaged 1.5% for the 5 years prior to April 2020, and was 2.1% for the 10-year period before COVID (and let’s not even think about where it was post GFC).
I’m not all warm and fuzzy about the consumer, but I’m not alarmed either.
Auto Loans
Auto loans are a bit trickier. From the consumer’s point of view, they tend to be at a fixed rate and many were entered into when rates were low. In fact, if memory serves me correctly, the average maturity of auto loans extended in recent years allowing consumers to lock in low rates for longer (hopefully the lenders hedged their rate exposure on those auto loans).
Used Auto Prices are Receding
Used car prices are declining from record highs. That may pose problems to lenders who calculated too much residual value on loans and leases to consumers who thought that we were in a brave new world where even used cars went up in value.
Having said that, the prices for used cars remain robust and my understanding is that it is still extremely difficult to buy the most popular new models (and they often fetch a premium to NAV). Nothing like in the heyday of the supply chain issues, but something that should “normalize” over time.
Auto dealers benefited from a lack of inventory, and I will be curious to see if they can retain their sales with low levels of inventory and (ultimately) pass some of those efficiencies through to the consumer.
With autos being such an important part of the economy, it is something that I watch, but much like the story we heard in credit cards, a lot of the negatives that I’m reading about are simply a “normalization” which may be healthy for generating not just a soft landing, but a sustainable soft landing. However, the “slowing” is something to think about.
The Excess Savings Lie
I will spare you the agony of going through bank deposit charts on a short-term and long-term basis and just jump straight to the long-term chart. I used purple and orange arrows because I generally reserve green for good and red for bad and I’m not sure that these are “good” or “bad” deviations from trend.
Bank Deposits are Falling! But to Levels Still Around Trend.
I have argued that the “excess” in bank savings was never going to be put into the stock market (one of the bull cases, which may even still be floating around). I also think that there is a lot more than meets the eye about why there is so much in “excess” savings. Sure, without a doubt, COVID boosted savings. One thing that I “forgot” to mention earlier (or maybe I saved it on purpose) about the good things that happened to consumers during COVID is that there were many moratoriums placed on various types of debt service (i.e., student loans).
We can all agree that some amount of cash stayed in savings accounts because while savings accounts earned 0%, so did everything else. As people realized that they could earn more on their money market funds, some amount was going to be taken out of savings accounts paying little interest. Though, I do have to say that I was at the local bank branch a few weeks ago taking out money from the ATM and someone before me had left a receipt showing $99k in their bank account. I immediately thought “who does that?”, but there are obviously people who want bank accounts up to the FDIC limit.
My view has been (and will continue to be) that many people “earmarked” money that they would have to pay in the future and set it aside in a savings account. If you know moratoriums will end (and let’s not forget, these loans typically accrued interest during these periods), then it would be prudent to set aside some money for when those payments got turned back on.
If my theory is correct, you should see bank deposits decline faster as these moratoriums end and the money that was “earmarked” for certain payments is withdrawn to make those payments. Please see American Ingenuity. Not great for the economy or spending, but is “normalization” really bad?
Generative AI
My intention is to use generative AI to help me do a report on “outliers”. This would include warning signs or positive things that the market may or may not be missing. After about an hour or so of brutally failed attempts this weekend, I gave up. I try to write these T-Reports with an estimate of how long it will take and how long the report will be but had absolutely zero clarity on whether the ChatGPT process would work. Hopefully I can make some interesting progress on the report early this week or I will declare it a failure. In any case, was Google trends (using generative AI) all you needed to buy or sell stocks successfully this year?
No one really cared about AI until February of this year. Yes, there were some searches, but very few. The Nasdaq 100 bounced in January, stagnated for a bit, and then started to do well from April until late July. It has sold off steadily since then. While not matching the trends in “generative AI” search, it might have been the best tool to use. The searches have stabilized and what will be interesting to see is if they peaked or if they increase as we end the summer and people are back at work fulltime across the board.
We will be focusing more on AI as Academy’s Advisory Board has grown the number of advisors with significant experience in the area and who are active today in the ongoing development of cyber and AI.
China
I promised that we’d get back to China, but for now I only want to highlight one chart. And, ironically, it is not a lie. It is the truth, and it is logical.
China’s Holdings of U.S. Treasuries
I highlight three periods.
Post GFC. When the U.S. economy was in tatters and much of the world was struggling, China was able to (or was willing to) accumulate more and more Treasuries. There is a lot of chatter about the decoupling of our economy from China’s right now, which is logical and will continue (the friction is real between the two nations and not getting better). I did, however, find it interesting that China accumulated so many Treasuries in the aftermath of the GFC. Prior to the GFC, the trend seemed obvious (U.S. was growing and buying stuff from China).
The tariffs sparked some discussion of potential retaliation from China, including the possibility that they would dump Treasuries. There was some decline in their holdings, but that could just as easily have been COVID related.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the decision to freeze Russia’s dollar holdings, there has been a steady decline in China’s Treasury holdings.
Some of the decline is due to the weakness in China’s economy and their potential need to prop up the property market (and maybe even those overly exposed to the “shadow banking system”).
Not only did we freeze Russia’s holdings (which tells me that we can do it again), but we have also been going after China on a myriad of fronts (most notably high tech, but increasingly for rare earths and critical minerals).
Our own debt ceiling issues and ratings may not help, but I’d be shocked if that entered into China’s calculus.
What I cannot tell from this chart is if it is an indication that China is successfully generating trade globally in yuan and has less need for dollars. That would fit my “shifting from made in China to made by China” view to a tee, but I’d be lying if I said that I could support that on this chart! Maybe generative AI will help me find evidence supporting that theory in places that I haven’t thought to look.
One thing that I think supports Treasury market bears is that there will be less of a global interest in holding Treasuries (with China leading the way).
Jobs
So much to do here and with or without AI, I will add more charts related to jobs later this week.
We have covered some of these areas in the past such as discrepancies in JOLTS between job openings and hires and the Establishment versus Household gaps. The fact that all these reports come in with declining response rates is another issue. It is difficult (mathematically) to accept the continuity of a data series when the response rate is declining without a serious investigation into why the response rate might be declining.
While we haven’t discussed it recently, the annual revisions always seem to dramatically reduce the published data for the prior year (but weirdly it doesn’t seem to have a market impact).
Today, I just bring up one chart because I find it fascinating in the lies, damned lies, and statistics theme.
The “Almost” Unbelievable Pattern of New Company Formation
The birth/death model is an estimate of jobs created or lost as new companies are formed or go out of business (or at least close enough for our purposes).
I challenge you to find any other jobs data that looks this “perfect”. It is a beautiful sawtooth pattern that looks almost uninterrupted! For most jobs data, the COVID period makes long-term charts almost impossible to review. The job losses and subsequent job gains are so large relative to any prior periods (or current periods) that these charts look like straight lines on either side of COVID.
Yet this chart seems almost perfect. This is a symmetrical “beauty”, but it is just a “plug”. It is something that clearly relies heavily on seasonality and I find it almost impossible to believe that this is so “predictable” (which makes me wonder how many other “plugs” or adjustments might be meaningless after the COVID shock). Meaningless, but this data is still used to determine policy and drive markets.
Inflation
I couldn’t be bothered. Sure, I will dig into this more, but I really don’t think that despite some Fed jawboning, anything (other than a large/sustained change in inflation) will do much to the Fed’s decision (which means that it will do little for bond markets). I am prepared to be wrong on this and will delve into it this week (with help hopefully from friends at ChatGPT), but inflation is low on my radar screen. However, there is one exception – will companies be able to grow earnings in the current inflation environment where it seems to be more difficult to push through final product price increases while input costs remain elevated?
Bottom Line
Seems like we are back to an “inflection” point where the debate between soft landing and “something less fun” is back on the table. The lag effect is regaining credibility (it always should have).
There are cases to be made for a variety of economic outcomes as we head into September and that is exciting from my seat!
I do think that we are in a period where price action drives what narratives we see: continued downward pressure on stocks will bring out more and more negative reports. One more short squeeze and suddenly AI, soft landing, and praise for Powell is all that we will see.
The US Treasury 10Y yield is now the highest post 2011 singaling further Fed rate increases.
Between The Federal Reserve’s outrageous overreaction to Covid (printing like there was no tomorrow), and Biden’s massive spending spree (lots of moldy (green) spending, we have see horrid inflation.
And The Fed trying (sort of) to combat inflation, we see that 30-year CONFORMING mortgage rate for 80% LTV or lower credit borrowers is up 163.5% under Bidenomics.
Under Bidenomics, public debt (owed by the US Treasury) is up 19% or greater than $5 triillion. Now wonder Biden throws are billions like it is water.
I seriously want the Biden Administration (and almost every member of Congress) why we are sending billions of dollars to Ukraine while barely giving Maui fire victims barely anything. The US is already $33 trillion in debt with >$193 trillion in unfunded liabilites. I want to ask Biden and Congress HOW the US is going to afford $193 trillion in unfunded liabilites?
Of course, NO ONE wants to face the reality of the disastrous fiscal poliicies of Washington DC politicians. Not McConnell, not McCarthy, not Schumer and especially not Billions Biden. Remember 10% for The Big Guy where Democrats argue that is meaningless. Or mini-me, Robert Reich (Clinton’s labor secretary) who claimed that the US economy is the best he has ever seen! Yes, Reich, for the top 1%. Of couse, no one will ask fools like Reich how we will pay for $33 trillion in debt and the $193 trillion in unfunded liabilies … and fund a war in Ukreiane in seeming perpetuity.
On Monday, Argentina’s central bank raised #interestrates to 118% as Argentina 30-year mortgage is now at a record 82.2%.
There is a record 350 Argentine Pesos for each US Dollar. All courtesy of Argentina’ version of Bidenomics … top down direction of spending and regulation and an out of control Central Bank.
The themesong of Bidenomics is Randy Newman’s “Mr. President,” Have pity on the working man instead of paying off green energy BIG donors.
The massive green enegy spending spree by Biden and Congress (disguised as Inflation Reduction Act) is the keystone of Bidenomics. Or loadstone.
Since Biden became President, hourly pay has risen 12%! Unfortunately, Bidenomics spending spree (along with endless Fed monetary stimulus) has caused inflation to rise 16%. That is a net -4% decline in REAL earnings.
10-Year Treasury Yield is now 4.28%, the highest level since October 2007. From a total return perspective, the 10-Year Treasury Bond is now down 1% in 2023, on pace for its third consecutive negative year. With data going back to 1928, that’s never happened before. BUT we’ve never had Joe Biden as President before 2021.
And then we have the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Idicators, sucking wind.
This is very strange. Global Treasury Yields just rose to a 15-year high (2008). This is primarily due to Central Bank moneta
And REAL 10-year Treasury yields also the highest since 2009.
At the same time, US industrial production is at the same level as pre-financial crisis (2007). Despite Federal Reserve monetary stimulypto (remember, The Fed’s balance sheet remains abouve $8 trillion.
This is Obama/Biden/Yellenomics. Trillions of dollars of fiscal (green) stimulus and monetary stimulus only to have industrial production be at the same level BEFORE The Great Recession and financial crisis.
Rates on 30-year mortgages in the US are now the highest since 2000, at 7.53%. Mortgage rates are now up 153% under Bidenomics. Rates have gone from sub 3% to above 7.50% under Inflation Joe.
US Treasury yields are playing catch-up from Yellen’s “Too low for too long” monetary policies.
Yes, in part we are playing catch-up from Yellen’s Reign of Error as Fed Chair (keeping rates too low for too long). Only in Washington DC, does gross incompetance warrant a promtion to US Treasury Secretary. Career half-wit Mean Joe Biden is El Presidente and acting like a third world dictator.
Bidenomics, which is also Yellenomics (the former Fed Chair and current Treasury Secretary) has The Good, The Bad and The Ugly to say for it.
First, The Good! The Atlanta Fed’s GDP Now real time GDP tracker has Q3 GDP at … 4.12%. Pretty good, but bear in mind that there is still more than $8 trillion in Fed Monetary Stimulus outstanding (aka, Yellenomics).
Second, The Bad. Bank credit growth is now negative.
As lenders are tightening credit standards for commercial and industrial loans.
The ugly? There are several candidates for this dishonor.
One, The Conference Board’s leading economic indicators is down -10.
Two, REAL median weekly earnings growth remains negative at -3.57% YoY.
Third, auto loan and credit card balances are at $1.5 TRILLION making further consumer credit more difficult to finance GDP growth.
Fourth, Real Gross Domestic Income growth was negative in Q1 2023.
I could go on and on about the negatives of Bidenomics (e.g., massive distortion of Federal spending towards green energy and big donors). Isn’t the earth moving closer to the Sun in its elliptical orbit?? HOW is spending trillions on green energy work as we move closer to the Sun??
During the COVID-19 pandemic the occurrence of remote work jumped, out of sheer necessity. The technology was already available, but the pandemic accelerated its adoption and bypassed the hesitation of employers to allow people working from home. In many cases, remote work has been successful and therefore seems to have become a permanent feature, often in hybrid form. For employers, it has become an employee benefit to attract people in a tight labor market and it saves on office space costs. The flipside of the latter is that demand for office space has seen a structural downward shift. It is estimated that the underlying value of office space in New York City has permanently declined by 39%. This suggests that at current prices, there is a bubble in commercial real estate. In this special we are particularly interested in the implications for financial stability and the economic outlook. First we take a look at the development of commercial real estate prices and commercial real estate lending. Then we discuss the Fed’s recent stress test on large banks that included a large decline in commercial real estate prices. In contrast to the Fed’s exercise, we show that distinguishing between large and small banks provides a sharper picture of the vulnerabilities in the US economy. In particular, the connection between commercial real estate and small banks, through commercial real estate lending, could pose a threat to financial stability and make a recession worse.
Commercial real estate heading south
If we plot the BIS commercial real estate price index, it is clear that since the Great Recession, commercial real estate (CRE) prices have more than doubled in nominal terms (the blue line in Figure 1), but have moved sideways since 2021. This suggests that prices have reached a plateau. However, in recent years inflation has obscured the movement of CRE prices in real terms (the orange line), which shows a peak in 2021, but since then there has been a decline, almost to the level during the COVID-19 pandemic. In other words, CRE prices are already failing to keep up with inflation. Is this an indication that the CRE bubble is already deflating? With nominal CRE prices remaining elevated, most of the nominal price correction is likely still to come. If the 39% estimate by Gupta et al. for New York City is representative for the entire United States, we are heading for a major decline in CRE prices.
We can also plot the BIS index against CRE lending to show3 that rising prices for commercial real estate sparked a credit boom in commercial real estate (Figure 2). Given the academic literature linking financial crises to credit booms and busts, this should be cause for concern. Moreover, Minsky (1986) notes that an emphasis by bankers on the collateral value and the expected values of assets (instead of cashflows) is conducive to the emergence of a fragile (as opposed to a robust) financial structure.
If excess demand for office space pushed up commercial real estate prices, and if that increased CRE lending by banks, what does a structural downward shift in demand for office space mean? If CRE prices are deflating, what does that mean for the indebted CRE sector? Is this going to lead to defaults? And what does that mean for the banks that did the CRE lending? Is the deflation of the CRE bubble a threat to financial stability? Also note that due to the steep hiking cycle by the Fed, some companies in the CRE sector may find it difficult to refinance their loans at substantially higher rates.
We can dig deeper by looking at the demand and supply developments in CRE lending. If we look at the Fed’s SLOOS data (figure 3), it is clear that demand for CRE loans strengthened especially between 2012 and 2017. Lending standards loosened between 2012 and 2015. This era coincides with a strong rise in the CRE price index, which may have motivated banks to expand CRE lending. Demand for CRE loans weakened during the pandemic, then bounced back as the economy reopened, but headed south again in 2022. Loan standards tightened during the pandemic, then loosened again when the economy rebounded, but have tightened since 2021. In other words, there seems to be a correlation between CRE prices and demand and supply developments in CRE lending. Currently, both are heading south, if we look at CRE prices in real terms and CRE lending in terms of net demand. It seems that rising CRE prices sparked a credit boom in CRE and now that the CRE price bubble is deflating, the CRE sector has less appetite to borrow and banks are tightening their lending standards.
The Fed’s incomplete stress test
CRE prices are falling in real terms and credit for the CRE loans is tightening. Does this pose a problem to the economy? Not if we believe the Fed’s June 28 press release that accompanied the annual bank stress test. The stress test looked at “a severe global recession with a 40 percent decline in commercial real estate prices, a substantial increase in office vacancies, and a 38 percent decline in house prices. The unemployment rate rises by 6.4 percentage points to a peak of 10 percent and economic output declines commensurately.” However, according to the Fed “all 23 banks tested remained above their minimum capital requirements during the hypothetical recession.” Therefore, the central bank concluded that “large banks are well positioned to weather a severe recession and continue to lend to households and businesses even during a severe recession.” However, one line in the press release reveals the main problem with the Fed’s stress test: “The banks in this year’s test hold roughly 20 percent of the office and downtown commercial real estate loans held by banks.” So where is the remaining 80%? If the stress test considers a huge decline in commercial real estate prices, it might be relevant to know how this affects the banks that hold 80% of the CRE loans made by banks. Therefore we take a closer look at CRE lending by large and small banks in the next section.
Bank lending: large vs small banks
We already saw in figure 2 that the rise in CRE prices until 2022 was accompanied by an increase in CRE lending. However, there is more to this story of we take a closer look at who has been doing the lending. So far we looked at aggregate bank lending to the CRE sector, without distinguishing between different types of banks. However, a closer look at the banking sector reveals a disturbing vulnerability that could be a threat to financial stability.
The Fed data on commercial banks distinguish between large and small banks. Large domestically chartered commercial banks are defined as the top 25 domestically chartered commercial banks ranked by size. Small domestically chartered commercial banks are defined as all domestically chartered banks outside of the top 25. Note that according to this definition a bank of say $80 billion would still be considered ‘small.’ In figure 4 we show how CRE lending has evolved, distinguishing between large and small banks.
It turns out that CRE lending by large banks has hardly increased in the last 15 years, while at the same time CRE lending by small banks has more than doubled. In other words, the growth in loans to commercial real estate has come from small banks. In fact, small banks have taken over the role of main provider of commercial real estate loans. Therefore, the Fed’s stress test omits the most relevant part of the banking sector for commercial real estate. While commercial real estate lending by large banks has remained stable since 2006, commercial real estate lending by small banks has increased rapidly. We could even talk of a credit boom in commercial real estate loans provided by small banks.
Whether the increased share of CRE lending by small banks is a problem also depends on the relative importance of CRE loans for small banks (Figure 5). FDIC data (Quarterly Banking Profile) distinguish at least three classes of asset size: more than $250 billion, $10-250 billion, and $1-10 billion. The first class contains only large banks as defined by the Fed stress test, the second class is a mix of large and small banks, the third class only contains small banks. While for the largest banks, CRE loans were only 5.7% of total assets in the first quarter of 2023, for the smallest banks this is 32.9%! For the intermediate-size banks the CRE loans are 18.4% of assets. So not only is 80% of the CRE bank loans made by small banks, these loans also make up a much larger fraction of the balance sheet of small banks.
Finally, it is important to note that small banks are regional banks. In fact, the US has so many small banks because for much of its history it was difficult for banks to open a branch in another state. This legislation has been abolished, and the amount of banks in the US has fallen, but there are still many small banks with predominantly regional clients. This means that CRE risk in small banks is also regionally concentrated. Instead of a diversified nationwide CRE loan portfolio, a small bank tends to make loans to local borrowers. Consequently, if commercial real estate in a region turns sour, the small banks in the area will be highly exposed. Bubble or not, any adverse development in the CRE sector is going to hit small banks harder than large banks.
The commercial real estate-small bank nexus brings together two vulnerable sectors that could rapidly deteriorate in a self-reinforcing loop. Small banks have already shown vulnerable to higher interest rates and deposit outflows in March and commercial real estate is high on the list of financial stability concerns of US regulators. We have shown that the two sectors are critically connected and in the next section we speculate on the feedback mechanisms that could arise and make things worse.
Roads to ruin: feedback mechanisms
The commercial real estate-small bank nexus allows for several scenarios in which both sectors could be destabilized. In the first two scenarios, a crisis occurs in one sector, causing problems in the other sector. Tighter credit and reduced activity in the CRE sector could push the economy into a mild recession. In the third scenario, a mild recession causes problems in both sectors, which could then reinforce each other and make the recession worse.
In scenario 1, a small banking crisis leads to problems in CRE. Given that the majority of CRE loans have been made by small banks, continued problems for small banks, caused by or leading to deposit flight, could force them to tighten lending to the CRE sector. This would reduce the supply of credit to CRE, causing additional problems for the CRE sector, on top of office vacancies and stagnating prices.
In scenario 2, a CRE crisis causes small banks to collapse. Even if small banks stabilize in the near future from the recent deposit flight problems, they could subsequently be dragged down by a crisis in the CRE sector. Defaults in CRE will asymmetrically hurt small banks rather than large banks, because of the concentration of CRE risks at small banks. This could lead to a new round of deposit flight from small banks to large banks and money market funds. The losses on loans and loss of funding could be lethal to small banks.
In scenario 3, a mild recession could cause a small banking crisis and a CRE crisis. In turn, this could lead to a more severe recession. A mild recession, for example caused by the Fed’s hiking cycle, will hurt the banking sector and the CRE sector at the same time. In particular, a recession would further reduce demand for office space. This will add to the problems in the CRE sector. Increased CRE defaults will hurt banks, especially the smaller ones with relatively more exposure to CRE. Losses on CRE loans will force banks to tighten credit, including for the CRE sector. The self-reinforcing problems in the two sectors could further drag down the overall economy, making the initially mild recession more severe. Specifically, tighter credit and reduced activity in the CRE sector will drag down GDP growth further.
We summarize the specific feedback mechanisms in the commercial real estate-small bank nexus in figure 6.
More broadly, we already saw in March how problems at small banks had an immediate adverse impact on financial markets. In combination with a faltering CRE sector this could severely undermine confidence among investors, consumers and businesses. This would have a broad-based negative impact on GDP growth.
Conclusion
COVID-19 appears to have a lasting negative impact on demand for commercial real estate. The federal regulators are aware of the risks in commercial real estate, but the Fed’s stress test provides a false sense of security. The finding that large banks are able to absorb losses on CRE loans in case of a CRE crisis is encouraging, but the bulk of CRE bank loans has been provided by small banks. In fact, while CRE lending by large banks has been stable, there has been a credit boom in CRE loans provided by small banks, more than doubling the amount since 2006. What’s more, small banks are more vulnerable to the CRE sector in terms of exposure and have already been hit by deposit outflows earlier this year. The commercial real estate-small bank nexus exposes the US economy to a vulnerability that could threaten financial stability and either cause a recession or make a recession more severe.
And another day, another inverted 10Y-2Y yield curve!
This chart goes along with negative bank credit growth.
Lastly, we have the Conference Board’s leading index plunging to -10!
Thanks in part to Cap’n Crunch, Fed Chair Jerome Powell!
“Bidenomics is indeed working!” claims Karine Jean-Pierre. “Cost is going down … wages going up, that is Bidenomics.”
Excuse me Karine. REAL weekly earnings growth remains negative as inflation outpaces weekly earnings growth. As of Q2 2023, REAL median weekly earnings growth is a dismal -3.57% YoY.
And if you are black, Bidenomics has failed you even worse! Q2 Real weekly earnings growth for black households was -6.23% YoY.
Confounded Interest - Anthony B. Sanders 
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